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Abstract
Although epidemiology is necessarily involved with elucidating causal processes, we argue that
there is little practical need, having described an epidemiological result, to then explicitly label it as
causal (or not). Doing so is a convention which obscures the valuable core work of epidemiology
as an important constituent of public health practice. We discuss another approach which
emphasizes the public health "use value" of research findings in regard to prediction and
intervention independent from explicit metaphysical causal claims. Examples are drawn from
smoking and lung cancer, with particular focus on the original 1964 Surgeon General's report on
smoking and the new version released in 2004. The intent is to help the epidemiologist focus on
the pertinent implications of research, which, from a public health point of view, in large part entails
the ability to predict and to intervene. Further discussion will center on the importance of
differentiating between technical/practical uses of causal language, as might be used in structural
equations or marginal structural modeling, and more foundational notions of cause. We show that
statistical/epidemiological results, such as "smoking two packs a day increases risk of lung cancer
by 10 times" are in themselves a kind of causal argument that are not in need of additional support
from relatively ambiguous language such as "smoking causes lung cancer." We will show that the
confusion stemming from the use of this latter statement is more than mere semantics. Our goal
is to allow researchers to feel more confident in the power of their research to tell a convincing
story without resorting to metaphysical/unsupportable notions of cause.
Introduction
Causal thinking and causal language in epidemiology
A primary goal of epidemiological research is the ability to
determine how exposures are related to outcomes. We are
interested, at the population level, in what caused the can-
cer, the heart attack, the cholera epidemic or the food poi-
soning. Our methods have developed rapidly over the last
four decades to account for, among other things, con-
founders, retrospective and longitudinal data, and bias. In
an effort to systematize the causal enterprise, similar to
efforts in other relatively young fields of scientific inquiry,
epidemiologists have sought to tie such methods to an
overarching causal rubric such as Popperian falsification,
Mill's analysis of causation in terms of necessity and suffi-
ciency, ceteris paribus conditions/control of confounding
[1] and/or counterfactuals. Such efforts, while being very
useful in advancing the field and providing guidance for
understanding exposure and outcome relationships, have
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tended to ignore the claim of Hume, among other writers,
that causal connections cannot be observed or objectively
proven. Thus, on the one hand, a great deal of effort is
spent to carefully develop methods aimed at revealing
causal relationships, while on the other we are being told
– rather persuasively – that we cannot ultimately deter-
mine causal relationships, or that we should refrain from
attempts to establish causal relationships because these
should be understood as different from nomological or
probabilistic relations. Obviously, these tensions have not
stopped scientific, let alone epidemiological, efforts from
proceeding apace (nor should they).
Nevertheless, fundamental issues bearing on how the rela-
tionship between exposures and outcomes are assessed,
interpreted and discussed, are left more ambiguous than
necessary. And to be clear, this is not just a theoretical
issue, since such ambiguity allows for real world problems
to arise that, with a small amount of care, are easily
avoided. In this essay, we will explore some limitations on
obtaining causal information, and on how such epidemi-
ological information should be disseminated, both to lay
and professional audiences, in a more useful and less con-
fusing manner than is often presented. The goal of our
argument is to invite a less anxious and more humble, yet
forceful, approach toward assessing epidemiological
research. This approach will show that the process of
examining exposures and outcomes is the important fac-
tor, in service to prediction and intervention, not an illu-
sory ability to identify and articulate apparently more
fundamental causal connections.
Analysis
Public health issues and causation-speak in the 2004 
Surgeon General's report
Among the possible reasons so much has been written
about causation and epidemiology is that in significant
ways epidemiology is a science, and as such is definition-
ally interested in causation. If there is a shared discourse
in epidemiology as a field it revolves around the manner
in which exposures are related to outcomes in service to
analyzing truly pressing public health issues.
Recently, a new Surgeon General's report on smoking,
responding to and expanding on the original 1964 report,
included a section explicitly discussing issues of causal
claims and providing guidelines for determining the
strength of causal relations [2]. The new report quotes the
original 1964 report: "after vigorous discussions they
could neither precisely define nor replace the word 'cause,'
a reflection of the same problem that philosophers have
confronted over the centuries." Further, the 1964 report
noted that
when a relationship or an association between smoking ...
and some condition in the host was noted, the signifi-
cance of the association was assessed. The characterization
of the assessment called for a specific term .... The word
cause is the one in general usage in connection with mat-
ters considered in this study, and it is capable of convey-
ing the notion of a significant, effectual relationship
between an agent and an associated disorder or disease in
the host. Granted that these complexities were recognized
it is to be noted clearly that the Committee's considered
decision to use the words ' "a cause" or "a major cause" or
"a significant cause" or "a causal association" ' in certain
conclusions about smoking and health affirms their con-
viction. [3] (p. 21)
The authors of the new report correctly point out that
while the original report is quite useful and serves as one
of the most important examples of comprehensive assess-
ment of exposures and outcomes in public health history,
there is some level of confusion associated with the lan-
guage of causation. Indeed, the 1964 report is clearly
struggling to articulate and justify its use of causal terms;
e.g., in the passage quoted, the strained language of the
last sentence is revealing. Circularity threatens when a
choice of terminology for the purposes of describing one's
findings is justified in part by a wish to "affirm convic-
tions" in regard to the findings. Are we to suppose that the
findings do not speak sufficiently eloquently for them-
selves?
In an attempt to address and even regiment the use of cau-
sation-speak, the authors of the new report, in addition to
providing a very comprehensive list of causal statements
related to smoking and health outcomes, discuss what
they consider to be a less confusing approach towards
using causal language and ascribing cause in epidemiol-
ogy. Unfortunately, their efforts, while clearly useful as a
guide to assessing possible implications of research, beg
the question of whether explicit causal language is really
needed in presenting and discussing research in the first
place. Other begged questions concern how such causal
language is necessarily linked to the substantive research
and how hierarchies of causal strength are to be deter-
mined.
Starting on page 11 of the new report [2], their careful list-
ing of causal statements from previous reports is strikingly
idle in view of the fact that in many of the statements in
the new report there is no explicit use of the word "cause"
when these succinctly describe the current state of
research. Examples are: "Autopsy studies suggest that cig-
arette smoking is associated with a significant increase in
arteriosclerosis of the aorta and coronary arteries,"
"Recent autopsy studies confirm that pulmonary emphy-
sema is much more frequent and severe in cigarette smok-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2005, 2:8 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/2/1/8
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ers than nonsmokers," or "Women cigarette smokers
experience an increased risk for subarachnoid hemor-
rhage."
These statements can be contrasted with others such as "It
is also more prudent to assume that the established asso-
ciation between cigarette smoking and coronary disease
has causative meaning than to suspend judgment until no
uncertainty remains" (p. 13, our emphasis). The discom-
fort on display in the last sentence is clear: responsible
prudence apparently dictates the use of explicit causal lan-
guage even though the findings, on their own, i.e. "estab-
lished association" can be taken to be a meaningful
statement of cause (more on this below). There is, further,
an implied and somewhat ambiguous assumption that
complete certainty, although not available here, is theo-
retically achievable, yet not needed, for causal informa-
tion to be conveyed. Although this latter point is one with
which we can strongly agree, we nevertheless argue that
worrying about complete certainty is not useful for the
simple reason that this level of certainty is not available.
Indeed, if the information obtained from the "established
associations" allows for effective prediction and/or inter-
vention, then it is not clear what other information or lan-
guage would be needed in terms of causal argumentation.
Thus, the above remark seems to be intended to justify
and/or motivate health policy (not necessarily a bad thing
but off-point for the purposes of this discussion) rather
than to improve our causal understanding of the relation-
ship between smoking and coronary disease.
One problem is that, as Hume described and the authors
confirm [2,4], while the use of causal language can be psy-
chologically compelling, the causal nexus will never lend
itself to be empirically detected or generally proven. Par-
ticularly in regard to the last statement from the Surgeon
General's report, uncertainty will always remain. This
uncertainty can be thought of as supporting a more prob-
abilistic approach towards causation [5]. Parascandola
and Weed point out that probabilistic models of causa-
tion are essentially more flexible than deterministic
approaches. Their argument centers on the idea that since
it is impossible to ever know all the constituent elements
in a deterministic causal model, why not allow for some
level of probabilistic ambiguity? The need to say anything
definitive about this dichotomy, however, is not in the
realm of the strictly scientific, nor is their discussion of
what constitutes science and what constitutes public
health policy, and why different notions of science might
apply to the two. Although these are different contexts, the
inability to "prove" or objectively "see" causation, how-
ever, still applies to both.
More importantly, a fundamental inability to determine
cause is not necessarily a serious concern for epidemiolo-
gists because causal information can still be conveyed
without getting bogged down in such epistemological and
metaphysical issues. Thus, the struggle to develop a causal
context relating tobacco to illness in the new report dis-
plays a level of anxiety that would be unnecessary if a
more pragmatic approach toward causal information
were used.
A short caveat on realism in science
We are not in this essay attempting to revisit the long-
standing debate between realism and pragmatism in sci-
ence. (A relatively current, although ultimately uncon-
vincing, exploration of realism in epidemiology was
discussed by Renton [6].) For the sake of making our argu-
ment, we accept the natural ontological attitude (NOA)
developed by Arthur Fine [7] as being closely in line with
our approach toward thinking about causation. His argu-
ment is, in fact, a generalization of what has been dis-
cussed here. That is, he asks what is the efficacy of having
something be considered "real" in the same manner as
something being determined as "causal." He is interested
in the ability to manipulate the world, to predict and
intervene. Being able to determine something as real, in a
metaphysically emphatic sense, something he and we
doubt can ever be accomplished, is beside the point when
dealing with the actual process of doing science.
An alternative approach toward causal thinking
Once a famous epidemiologist, K, stated that causation is
easy, "smoking causes lung cancer," adding a sarcastic "it's
obvious" shrug of his shoulders to emphasize his point.
This was in answer to a naïve query regarding how certain
we could be about ever saying that X causes Y. K's response
was a catalyst to our interest in epidemiologists' use of
causal language, both in the day-to-day workings of any
particular epidemiological project and in the more
extended long-range meta-discussions bearing on causal
thinking in epidemiology. It is our suggestion that K's
remark, while presumably intended to lend scientific
weight to the findings that he had in mind, might rather
have done them a disservice.
What, if anything, would underwrite an explicit causal
claim, in this kind of context? We shall consider an admit-
tedly not uncontroversial discussion of causality by
G.E.M. Anscombe [8]. She identifies a claim shared by
received philosophical views about causal connections as
being either a kind of necessary connection between events,
or as instancing an exceptionless generalization – a universal
claim – saying that a certain kind of event will always be
preceded by certain others: "If an effect occurs in one case
and a similar effect does not occur in an apparently simi-
lar case, there must be a relevant further difference." [8]
(p. 88)Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2005, 2:8 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/2/1/8
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Versions of the associations of causality with either neces-
sity or universality are found throughout the history of
philosophical thinking about the subject – Anscombe
mentions Aristotle, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Kant and
Russell – although the accounts vary greatly with respect
to whether the focus is on necessity or universality. Aristo-
tle, Spinoza and Hobbes go for necessity, with the latter
expressing the connection as being logically rather than
naturally compelling, and so does Kant, who secured
necessity (and also invariability) by introducing the idea
of causality as a rule governing our very ability to under-
stand sequences of events. Hume famously saw no neces-
sity at work in the collision between two billiard balls. He
described how the potential for experiencing the same
thing repeatedly – an experience of "constant conjunc-
tion" – provided the basis for an irresistible, species-wide,
but ultimately psychological idea of necessity. This was
considered an essential but not empirically justifiable part
of the complex idea of causality. Hume explained the lat-
ter as an upshot of experienced exceptionless  generality.
(Kant's view was of course motivated by the "scandalous-
ness" of this "too disastrous to be true" position.) Russell,
at one stage, argues that it is for universality to explain the
notion of causal connections as being necessary. What
they all share, however, is that causation is about necessity
or universality or both.
Anscombe challenges this fundamental view; i.e., she
challenges the shared claim quoted above:
... it's not difficult to show it prima facie wrong to associate
the notion of cause with necessity or universality in this
way. For, it being much easier to trace effects back to
causes with certainty than to predict effects from causes,
we often know a cause without knowing whether there is
an exceptionless generalization of the kind envisaged, or
whether there is a necessity. [8] (pp. 136–137)
Thus if one, for example, has been intimate with someone
developing mononucleosis, one might expect to contract
it, and if one does one would assume that one knows the
cause, but no doctor would venture to bet on one's com-
ing down with the disease if invited to do so before a diag-
nosis.
What is Anscombe's point? She proposes that we may
have causal knowledge without having clarified what is
involved in causation, in any of the heavy-duty philo-
sophical senses discussed above:
Compare the possibility of wanting clarification of
'valency' or 'long-run frequency,' which yet have been
handled by chemists and statisticians without such clarifi-
cation; and valencies and long-run frequencies, whatever
the right way of explaining them, have been known. Thus
one of the familiar philosophic analyses of causality, or a
new one in the same line, may be correct, though knowledge
of it is not necessary for knowledge of causes. [8] (p. 136, our
emphasis)
Moreover, both necessity and universality fail to focus,
she argues, on something "so obvious as to seem trite,"
and proposes to replace the shared feature of accounts of
causality given above with the following:
... causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from
its causes. This is...the common feature of causality in its
various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come of,
their causes. For example, everyone will grant that physi-
cal parenthood is a causal relation. Here the derivation is
material, by fission. Now analysis in terms of necessity or
universality does not tell us of this derivedness of the
effect; rather, it forgets about that. For the necessity will be
that of the laws of nature; through it we shall be able to
derive knowledge of the effect from knowledge of the
cause, or vice versa, but that does not show us the cause as
source of the effect. Causation, then, is not to be identified
with necessitation. [8]
Causal claims thus assert something other than the claim
that the effect would not have occurred if the cause had
not occurred; rather, they say something about how the
effect was brought about by the cause. It is her claim that
the philosophical tradition, by not attending to this,
misses out on something fundamental to causality.
But doesn't this also accurately characterize a kind of
question that epidemiology is normally not in a position
to answer, and that it is also not part of its typical purview?
The epidemiologist might find himself at home in the
philosophical tradition that Anscombe is concerned to
put to one side, or that part of it which looks to strict or
statistical laws when attempting to articulate the essence
of causal relations, and choose to dismiss her attempt to
refocus philosophical awareness of causation as irrele-
vant. But to the extent that he finds Anscombe's argument
intriguing, even if not compelling, to that same extent he
is faced with reasons to refrain from couching his findings
in causal language. This is of course not to say that there
couldn't be causal statements about the relationship
between, say, smoking and cancer, presumably uncovered
by scientists in the areas of physiology and medicine, but
they would presumably venture to articulate precisely how
the effect is brought about by the cause, in given cases.
Anscombe remarks that our knowledge of causality is
acquired through the learning of diverse causal concepts
associated with actions and events. If talk about causes
shows the possession of a concept "cause," this is a sophis-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2005, 2:8 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/2/1/8
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ticated addition to the language of someone mastering
other causal concepts:
... the word 'cause' can be added to language in which are
already represented many causal concepts. A small selec-
tion: scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, burn, knock over, keep off,
squash, make (e.g. noises, paper boats), hurt. But if we care
to imagine languages in which no causal concepts are rep-
resented, then no description of the use of a word in such
languages will be able to represent it as meaning cause. [8]
(p. 137)
In an epidemiological vein, when we say for lung cancer
that smoking increases risk by ten times compared to
those who do not smoke, the causal language is "increases
risk by ...." What is the purpose then of adding "and this
is likely to be a causal relationship"? Some may point out
that that one statement can stand in for the other, and we
would agree (under very specific circumstances), but this
begs the question as to why epidemiologists seem to need
to privilege one type of causal utterance over another, or
to redundantly use language that explicitly uses the word
"cause." Further, there is actually an asymmetry here
between types of causal utterances. Claiming that some-
thing "increases risk" is, for the most part, less ambiguous
than saying something causes another. Thus, in practice,
different kinds of causal statements are not necessarily
substitutable.
The knowledge of having hands
Readers with a surplus of philosophical patience might
perhaps join us in also considering K's response against
the background of G.E. Moore's famous attempt to argue
that he had at least some bits of knowledge that were cer-
tain, and Wittgenstein's comments. Moore argued for the
claim "I know I have two hands!" by first holding up one,
while remarking, "Here is one hand," then the other
[9,10]. This approach to knowledge, while intending to
appear naïve, is actually under-girded by a sophisticated
epistemological superstructure [11]. The thought was,
roughly, that knowledge claims might be supported and
skepticism about empirical knowledge refuted by provid-
ing examples of bits of such knowledge unquestionably
available to a subject's mind in its perceptual encounter
with his environment.
Wittgenstein was not convinced. His argument, much
watered-down, went something like the following: let's
say someone is playing a piano sonata, it is clearly a piece
that is demanding two hands, but while he is playing he
suddenly yells to his audience "I know I have two hands!"
This phrase, apropos of nothing, is essentially meaning-
less; the knowledge of the two hands is, as it were, implicit
in the playing of the sonata, the utterance of his claim to
"know" this is idle. Indeed, if someone came up to you
and said, completely out of the air, "I know I have two
hands," there would be no context and no real informa-
tion conveyed. He claimed in On Certainty [12] that
Moore's attempt to justify his knowledge claim was mis-
guided, and is interested in reinterpreting what is going on
in such an example. He argues that although Moore's
knowledge claims are indeed of a kind that it does not
make sense to doubt, this is not because they are sup-
ported by irrefutable evidence:
The propositions, however, which Moore retails as exam-
ples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not
because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows
them, but because they all have a similar role in the sys-
tem of empirical judgments. [12] (remark 137)
What is this "role"? Wittgenstein characterizes these
claims metaphorically as, for example, what one can "dis-
cover ... like the axis around which a body rotates. ...
[where] the movement around [the axis] determines its
immobility" (remark 152), as the "rock bottom of one's
convictions, ...one might almost say that these foundation
walls are carried by the whole house" (remark 248), or "...
the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the
fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as
it were like hinges on which those turn" (remark 341).
These claims are then a kind of spin-off from the use of
language, mistaken for empirical propositions, and
treated by Moore as exempt from doubt. But,
I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts
he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regard-
ing it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt
and enquiry. [12] (remark 151)
Wittgenstein was making the argument that knowledge is
really not explicable unless tied to a process of doing
things in the world. We know the pianist has two hands
by virtue of his playing the sonata; the epidemiologist's
research on exposures and effects, and his findings, make
it impossible not to think of smoking as a cause of cancer,
although the claim transpires rather than follows from the
material.
The redundancy of emphatic causation claims
Let's look at an example of the effect of introducing an
emphatic causality-claim into an epidemiological context.
Consider the differences between saying
(1) Smoking causes lung cancer,
(2) If you smoked 2 packs a day for X amount of years,
your chance of getting lung cancer would be 10 times
greater than a non-smoker,Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2005, 2:8 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/2/1/8
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and finally,
(3) If you smoked 2 packs a day for X amount of years,
your chance of getting lung cancer was 10 times greater
than a non-smoker and it's causal! (Perhaps stamping
one's feet for emphasis.)
Statement (1) needs the information in statement (2) to
be useful from an epidemiological or public health stand-
point. Statement (2) describes (of course in a somewhat
sketchy way) an increased risk (in itself a causal state-
ment) associated with exposure. (Information about
attributable risk could also be included.) Does any other
information need to be conveyed, beyond such descrip-
tion, such as in statement (3)? What is the nature of this
last statement? Is the addition of "and it's causal" to state-
ment (3) based on the content of statement (2) in a man-
ner that makes (3) into an articulation of something that
necessarily follows from (2), although it is not articulated
there? Or does "and it's causal" convey some additional
information that is useful/necessary, and if so, on which
grounds?
Although epidemiologists may think that being able to
say very specifically that smoking causes lung cancer is an
important part of the research process, this kind of claim
would not be underwritten by research findings. One
might speculate that being able to make an explicitly
causal claim is a desideratum for the professional culture,
a desire or inculcated need to be able to make use of
explicit causal language when stating conclusions or find-
ings. After all, the use of causal language for purposes of
summarizing or concluding may allow others to quickly
ascertain whether this research is worth paying attention
to or not, depending on whether causal claims are being
made. That such claims might also be policy-driven,
rather than demanded by the research effort itself, need
not be germane to such a cultural trait.
The causal work actually done (i.e., the useful scientific
information) is rather embedded in the longer detailed
description or story, and this does not necessarily have to
include any explicit language involving claims about cau-
sation. What we can say, with absolute certainty (taking
into account different variables), is that a specific associa-
tion was found. We cannot, with similar certainty, say that
a causal relationship was found, nor do we need to do so.
The former claim is accurate to the extent that the research
methods were good and repeatable, the latter, explicitly
causal claim, may not even be capable of being assessed.
More than semantics
This may seem, as mentioned before, to be just a semantic
quibble, but it is not just that. Whether – as Hume argued
– causation can neither be proven nor fully experientially
justified, or the findings provide inadequate clues as to
how the assumed effect was brought about by the assumed
cause, we are in effect left with provisional approaches
toward treating such relationships between exposures and
outcomes [4] (pp. 4–10). To be clear, we are not arguing
that people do not think in causal ways, but that when we
try as epidemiologists very explicitly to say "X causes Y,"
we put ourselves in a position similar to that of G.E.
Moore saying "I know I have two hands." The knowledge
is in the doing; the causal information is in the explicit
explanation of how smoking is related to lung cancer.
If we allow the extra language of causation, we need to ask
how such an utterance is related to the research at hand. Is
there something about research per se that demands causal
language, along the lines of "X causes Y," be used when
describing the results of the research? Or perhaps there is
something that is demanded by the need to do the
research in the first place, for example determining what
caused the disease outbreak at the picnic. Or perhaps there
even is something about the culture of epidemiological
research (or all scientific research for that matter) that
necessitates being able to say X causes Y.
It may appear that a researcher who has a great deal of
expertise in an area of research, such as lung cancer and
smoking, should be able to say simply and plainly that
"smoking causes lung cancer," based on specific research
findings. The problem is that the reasons for this "should
be able to say" will not be directly supported by the
research itself; it is not what makes this choice of words
compelling. There is no more direct justification for this
than for needing to say "I know I have two hands." The
person uttering this may also think that they "should be
able to say" that this is the case and provide a series of rea-
sons, such as professional expertise, the demands of the
piano culture, his comedy routine, etc.
The researcher's need to say "X causes Y" reveals some-
thing about his state of mind and his beliefs about what
the research shows, but this information is not pertinent
to the presentation of the research itself. Thus, we would
argue that there are only two states the researcher is left
with. If a knowledge or causal statement is uttered without
context, whether the playing of the piano, or the setting
out of a research process, such a claim is unsupportable.
Within the particular context of epidemiological research,
the claim is redundant and misleading.
The reader, at this point, may think we are being too harsh
on the researcher who has many years of research experi-
ence and understands the literature, important alternative
hypotheses, etc. All this may be true and the researcher
may be contributing important information. The problem
comes when the researcher is appealing to only theEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2005, 2:8 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/2/1/8
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research itself to support the claim of causation, and the
research itself is mute about causation per se, although elo-
quent, hopefully, about how, let's say, smoking increases
the risk for lung cancer under specific conditions, control-
ling for confounders and avoiding biases. There is nothing
separate from the results of the research that announces
itself as causal. The researcher calling the relationship
between smoking and lung cancer a "causal connection"
will not be able to point to any element or grouping of ele-
ments in the research that unambiguously shows a causal
relationship. The researcher can, and even hopefully will,
use tools such as analyses of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions, or counterfactual formulations in his research.
Nevertheless, even competent handling of tools associ-
ated with the search for causal relations does not magi-
cally bestow a right to base causal claims on the findings.
Causal anxiety in the 2004 Surgeon General's report
In the new Surgeon General's report [2], the problem is
most easily observed in the scale developed to gauge
strength of language used in making causal statements
about research. The four-level hierarchy for classifying the
strength of causal inferences based on available evidence
is as follows (page 18):
A. Evidence is sufficient to infer a causal relationship.
B. Evidence is suggestive but not sufficient to infer a causal
relationship.
C. Evidence is inadequate to infer the presence or absence
of a causal relationship (which encompasses evidence that
is sparse, of poor quality, or conflicting).
D. Evidence is suggestive of no causal relationship.
Different causal methods may be used to choose a partic-
ular category among A-D, but no operational criteria for
choosing among them is in fact being proposed; the
authors instead appeal to a shared notion of what is
appropriate in the field. Such an approach is of course fine
as long as it is seen for what it is, and is not.
Further, the authors explicitly state that counterfactual
claims provide the preferred basis for causal claims: "In
this report, the definition of cause is based on the notions
of a 'counterfactual' state." [2] (p. 19) Although counter-
factuals do provide a powerful approach toward under-
standing how exposures and outcomes may be related, the
specific claim that somehow this particular manual for the
proper usage of causal terms might serve as the final arbi-
ter of causal claims is troubling for a number of reasons.
First, there are many causal tools that are important in
helping to determine relationships between exposures
and outcomes, but what would justify the promotion of
this particular approach compared to others? This is a
highly provisional claim that fails to account for the fact
that counterfactual approaches, like all causal approaches,
cannot provide a generally applicable definition of cause
(per se) [13]. There are always exceptions and ambiguities
that finally point to the undeniable conclusion that meth-
ods to determine causal relations are not synonymous
with observing objective cause.
Secondly, why does a causal claim need to be made
explicit? The authors of the report are quite clear on this
when they say, "Without the mantle of 'causal,' the iden-
tification of a 'risk factor' does not necessarily carry with it
the certainty of disease prevention or delayed onset fol-
lowing exposure reduction or removal." They go on to say,
somewhat confusedly, that "the characteristics of evidence
that merit calling an association causal involve extra-statis-
tical judgments. Because the claim is so central to disease
prevention ...." (p. 19). There is a hiatus here between the
information in the research findings and the need to come
to causal conclusions for the purposes of using these
research findings for public health intervention. Although
we agree that intervention is an essential part of epidemi-
ological and public health research, it is not clear that
being able to say that X causes Y makes any sense, in this
regard, except in a very highly contextualized/technical
setting. The authors use an ends-justifying-the-means-
argument that assumes that explicitly being able to say X
causes Y is a necessary element of public health research.
Telling a good story
Our point is that although it is important to be able to use
epidemiological research to predict and intervene at the
public health level, to tell the best story possible about the
research findings at hand, one doesn't have to say that X
causes Y to achieve such an outcome. In fact, one cannot
definitively claim such a relationship. We think the
approach of the Surgeon General's report is commendable
in detailing how one can obtain useful information from
epidemiological data. Indeed, showing that smoking,
controlling for a host of possible confounders in a cohort
setting, increases risk for lung cancer is an adequate causal
statement. There is nothing speculative in such a claim; we
may accurately describe results in terms of estimates of
effects, measures of statistical variance and control of con-
founders, hopefully replicable, in the best tradition of sci-
entific research. All of this is non-controversial with regard
to the practice of epidemiology. There is little room for
ambiguity, although one may interpret data in many dif-
ferent ways. But neither of this requires, nor does it sup-
port the shift to causal language on the part of the authors;
the conclusions and decisions that depend on beliefs
about causation can be left to the readers.Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2005, 2:8 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/2/1/8
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When considering how we need to think causally in a
public health setting, the salient points involve the useful-
ness of the information for prediction and possibly inter-
vention. Thus, the usefulness and value of the long,
patient description ultimately derives from how well peo-
ple are convinced that this information provides a basis
for some kind of intervention or prediction. Although
much has been written about causation, we may, as Sosa
and Tooley [12] and Cartwright [1] argue, never be able to
have anything but a very specific "singularist" sense of
causation; i.e., a sense of causal thinking that is not capa-
ble of being generalized with rules or methods, but is
insurmountably contextual [8]. Far from being an obsta-
cle, such an approach allows for a great deal more clarity
regarding the interpretation of epidemiological research.
As mentioned above, this approach appears to be in line
with the work of Parascandola and Weed [5] when they
point out that probabilistic models of causation are essen-
tially more flexible than deterministic approaches.
Whether discussing determinism in causation or more
humble, but no less important, issues about causal tools,
there is no need to worry about generalizing the discus-
sion. At best, these tools may act as guides that may make
specific research more useful for the purposes of interven-
tion or prediction, without providing access to posited
objective causal relationships. That certain contexts, such
as legal definitions of what constitutes cause, may force a
specific notion of cause to come into play; e.g., as
demanded by a rule making body like the office of the
Surgeon General, or a Judge, provides no added signifi-
cance to saying that X causes Y. Clearly, certain contexts
may demand a very specific use of causal language. Such
technical usage of "cause" etc., perhaps in a deterministic
way, as might be demanded by a legal process, will occur
in a specific setting. For example, a question such as "how
much of the paralysis was caused by the faulty tires?" may
be unambiguously germane for the purposes of adjudicat-
ing a tort case in which a specific notion of cause is intro-
duced and accepted by all parties. Perhaps such uses of
"cause" etc. need this level of description.
In another related example, one might ask, what of the sit-
uation when undertaking a marginal structural model
(MSM) analysis in which the research differentiates
between casual effects and mere effects? Is this not a justi-
fied use of cause? The answer is a qualified yes, because
such a use is highly defined and limited in its meaning.
For the sake of MSM analysis, a causal effect is differenti-
ated from a non-causal effect as a function of how well rel-
evant (a judgment call as to what is relevant) confounders
and indirect effects are included in the model. The more
complete the more "causal" argument is in regard to alter-
native hypotheses, the better – i.e., more causal – the
model. Crude effects, on the other hand, are those that
have included minimal, if any, control of relevant con-
founding and inclusion of indirect effects. There is no
hard-and-fast test of when a mere effect becomes a causal
effect. This assessment is up to those doing the research
and those who assess it. Thus, what a causal effect seems
to actually stand for is a more rigorous analysis. This rig-
orous analysis will hopefully yield more useful informa-
tion than a less rigorous analysis in regard to intervention
and/or prediction. The work here is not in the naming of
something as causal, but in the actual rigor of the analysis.
The causal language is thus a shortcut that denotes such
rigor. Any foundational causal claims are, in fact, the
result of circular reasoning. The main point here is that
highly contextualized technical/statistical uses of causal
language are not the same as making general causal claims
about, for example, smoking causing lung cancer. We are
always forced back into asking "under what conditions?"
Conclusion
We have argued that saying smoking causes lung cancer is
either an empty or a redundant statement from a scientific
perspective; implicitly or explicitly it belongs in the realm
of health policy. Epidemiologists need to be constantly
aware of the limits of causal language and also of the
demands of making explicit causation claims.
When attention is not sufficiently paid to properly contex-
tualizing causal claims and loosely using causal language,
there are potentially real world consequences. For exam-
ple, cigarette company lawyers were often heard to say
that the case has not been definitively made that smoking
caused lung cancer. They said this knowing full well that
in the real world, there is nothing that can be definitively
claimed. Nevertheless, this should not, in any way, be an
obstacle for epidemiologists in the role, for example, of
expert witnesses, who put forward the strongest possible
account of a given research program, such as one that
links smoking to lung cancer. Indeed, the best we can
hope for here is to make the most compelling case, the
most persuasive account, and hope that it will be more,
rather than less, convincing. This is not a nihilistic throw-
ing of the baby out with the bathwater. Not being able to
say something is definitively causal does not mean that
extremely useful information is not available; it is simply
not available in the way that is traditionally demanded by
this specific research community.
And here we must emphasize that there really is some-
thing different about implicit and explicit causal argu-
ments. We can easily defend the claim that a ten-fold risk
was found for two pack-a-day smokers compared to those
who did not smoke. We simply cite the methods and
research findings. We cannot defend the additional
explicit claim that this is a causal relationship in the same
manner. In fact, trying to justify such a claim results in cir-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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cular explanations, as seen in the 2004 Surgeon General's
report.
Unfortunately, even under the best conditions, we have
no control over what rational or irrational processes a per-
son will employ to assess usefulness or causation. For the
cigarette executives, at one point in time, almost nothing
could have been thought convincing. We could, however,
imagine that as the power of the research findings
mounted, there would be a decrease in the number of
executives actually smoking. This, for us, is a promising
kind of convincing causal argument, one that is based in
actual changes made in the world. Thus, one could
describe a narrative where risk is found to increase 10
times for smokers versus non-smokers and 20 years later
tobacco executives were smoking in far reduced numbers.
Obviously, similar changes did occur in the general popu-
lation after the first Surgeon General's report appeared in
1964. There is, however, no final arbiter in this regard.
Thus, we cannot create a fail-safe scale, or "causal" regime
that will, simply by reaching a certain threshold, result in
an uncontroversial notion of "causal" or causation, per se.
Efforts to establish standards for making causal claims, as
in the new Surgeon General's report, should be encour-
aged as long as the focus is on developing a more coherent
and shared sense of what makes specific research efforts,
such as examining lung cancer and smoking, more useful
for public health and medical purposes. Explicit causal
language, if used in a very technical, agreed-upon sense,
such as in the MSM modeling example above, could be
similarly useful. But this use of technical causal language,
a good use, in our estimation, must be recognized as sim-
ply a shorthand for better versus worse analyses, as judged
by the author, and not a metaphysical statement about
causation per se (which is beyond what we can learn from
epidemiological findings). Given the difficulties
described above, the establishment of an unambiguous
meaningful and general notion of causal claims, besides
being, for all practical purposes, unavailable, is unneces-
sary for the real world task of prediction and intervention
at the public health level. Thus, claims such as "X is likely
to be a causal factor for Y" should only be made if suffi-
cient context and definition is provided, and omitted oth-
erwise. For epidemiology, in particular, and science
generally, the devil is in the details.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the editor-in-chief Carl V. Phillips and the anony-
mous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. They have made this 
a much stronger effort than it would have been otherwise. We would also 
like to thank Kathryn C. Dowling for her exceptional editorial assistance.
References
1. Cartwright N: An empiricist defence of singular causes.  In Logic,
Cause and Action: Essays in Honour of Elizabeth Anscombe, Royal Institute
of Philosophy Supplement #46 Edited by: Teichman R. Cambridge ,
Cambridge University Press; 2000:47-58. 
2. US Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Surgeon
General: The Health Consequences of Smoking: A Report of
the Surgeon General.  Washington, D.C. ,  U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, CDC; 2004. 
3. U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare: Smoking and
Health.  Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service.  Washington D.C. ,  U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service,
CDC; 1964. 
4. Wilson F: Hume's Defense of Causal Inference.  Toronto , Uni-
versity of Toronto Press; 1997:439. 
5. Parascandola M, Weed DL: Causation in epidemiology.  Journal of
Epidemiology and Community Health 2001, 55:905-912.
6. Renton A: Epidemiology and causation: a realist view.  Journal
of Epidemiology and Community Health 1994, 48:79-85.
7. Fine A: The Shaky Game:  Einstein Realism and the Quantum
Theory.  2nd edition. Chicago , The University of Chicago Press;
1996:224. 
8. Anscombe GEM: Causality and determination.  In The Collected
Philosophical Papers of GEM Anscombe, Volume Two, Metaphysics and the
Philosophy of Mind Minneapolis , University of Minnesota Press;
1981:133-147. Reprinted in Causation.  Edited by Sosa E, Tooley M.
New York:  Oxford University Press; 1993.. 
9. Moore GE: Proof of an external world.  Proceedings of the British
Academy 1939, 25:273-300.
10. Stroll A: Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty.  New York ,
Oxford University Press; 1994:206. 
11. Wittgenstein L: On Certainty.  Edited by: Anscombe GEM, von
Wright GH. New York , Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.; 1969. 
12. Sosa E, Tooley M: Introduction.  In Causation Edited by: Sosa E, Too-
ley M. New York , Oxford University Press; 1993:1-35. 